Disagreements between Azerbaijan and Turkey, traditionally regarded as brotherly allies, run deeper than the ban on wearing hijabs in Azerbaijani schools, which has sparked discontent in Turkey. Baku is clearly seeking to move beyond its status as the 'junior brother', while economic interests may also be contributing to the tensions.
Erdoğan and Aliyev continue to call each other brothers, but many people in both countries believe Azerbaijan is unhappy with its position in the relationship with Turkey. Despite this, the two countries continue their military cooperation: Turkey supplies weapons to Azerbaijan, Turkish military personnel train the Azerbaijani army, and the latter is being developed along the lines of the Turkish NATO model.
Following its victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan has become a more influential player in the South Caucasus. Aliyev recently stated that no one helped Azerbaijan during the 2020 war and that the country purchased its weapons at global market prices, seemingly overlooking Turkey's support.
The disagreements became public in October. Azerbaijan's representative at the UN General Assembly did not leave the hall during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech, unlike representatives of several other countries. Following this, Azerbaijan's Ministry of Education banned the wearing of hijabs in schools, prompting a critical response from Erdoğan.
Neither president mentioned the other's name in their speeches. Instead, their positions were presented by the media. Publications appeared in the Azerbaijani press accusing Turkey of trying to use Azerbaijan as a bank to solve its own economic problems.
At the same time, economic ties are reciprocal. Azerbaijan's state-owned SOCAR is Turkey's largest foreign investor, while Turkey, alongside Georgia, is one of the main routes for transporting Azerbaijani gas to Europe and is itself a major recipient of gas supplies from Azerbaijan.
The current situation in Azerbaijan-Turkey relations shows that a military alliance does not necessarily mean that political and economic interests fully coincide. Baku no longer wants to be seen merely as a country receiving support from Ankara. Following its victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan has strengthened its regional position, which has also changed how relations between the two countries are perceived.
There is also an economic contradiction. SOCAR's investments in Turkey are substantial, but Turkish territory and infrastructure are equally important for Azerbaijani gas exports. This interdependence limits the possibility of a sharp deterioration in relations. At the same time, the dispute over the hijab shows that the disagreements between the two sides are not purely economic: they also concern secularism, religious influence and the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy.
