U.S. armed forces have depleted critically important long-range missile stockpiles, leaving arsenals largely with systems that have a range of less than 450 kilometers. This is stated in a report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, which analyzed munitions consumption data as of November 3 to assess how the use of missiles against Iran affects U.S. defense capability worldwide.
During the 39-day military operations lasting until the April 8 ceasefire and subsequent operations, the United States consumed one-third to two-thirds of key munitions. Although the Pentagon has signed contracts with manufacturers to speed up production rates, and Congress may allocate additional funds, action must be taken quickly to replenish the arsenal, as strain on stockpiles has created vulnerabilities.
The report raises the question of whether the United States has enough munitions to resume combat operations. Against Iran, the short answer is yes. With China, however, there are serious concerns, because replenishing stockpiles will require multi-year efforts far longer than the current crisis.
The list of missile types was divided into nine categories, seven of which were rated as "negative" in terms of replenishment capabilities. Patriot, THAAD, and Standard Missile air-defense missiles were described as "heavily used with no way to replace," indicating the severity of stockpile conditions. Long-range missiles, including Tomahawk, AGM-158 JASSM, and PRSM, were characterized as "widely used" and partially replaceable. The only types without significant limitations in most scenarios are short-range munitions, including short-range missiles, air-to-air missiles, and aerial bombs.
Although the U.S. can still strike nearby targets with available missiles, the shortage of long-range munitions creates problems at the operational level. Experts noted that the United States has plenty of munitions with the power and precision of long-range systems, but with a range of less than 450 kilometers, because of which Washington risks losing the ability to project force over long distances with ballistic missiles.
This picture is particularly notable in that it shows the difference between operating in nearby directions and maintaining military capability over a long distance. When the main emphasis remains on munitions with a range of up to 450 kilometers, that already changes how the deployment of forces and assets is planned.
Contracts and additional funding can help speed up the process, but the results will not be seen right away. This is specifically a case where decisions on paper are made much faster than arsenals are replenished in practice.
In the coming months, the focus will be on how quickly progress can be made, especially on systems noted in the report as difficult or partially replaceable. Here it is clearly seen that managing a short-term crisis and replenishing long-term stockpiles are different challenges.

